Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection
Assoc. Prof. Ivan Diaz-Rainey
University of Otago
Time & Place
Mon, 23 Oct 2017 15:00:00 NZDT in Law 411
All are welcome
This paper examines the impact that lobbying has on the time it takes to detect managerial misconduct and on the outcome of the case. Consistent with Yu and Yu (2011), managers of lobbying firms are able to get away with misconduct for longer up to 2004. Further, we show that they are marginally less likely to have to settle a class action up to 2004. From 2005, however, lobbying no longer impacts the time it takes to detect misconduct or the outcome of the case. We argue that SOX has had the desirable effect of reducing the tacit power of lobbying firms.
Dr. Ivan Diaz-Rainey is Co-Director of the Otago Energy Research Centre (OERC) and is a Senior Lecturer in Finance at the University of Otago. He is Associate Editor of the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance and has previously held academic positions at the University of East Anglia (Norwich, UK), the European University Institute (Florence, Italy), where he was a Jean Monnet Fellow, and the Higher Colleges of Technology (Abu Dhabi, UAE). He has previously conducted research, policy and consultancy work for a number of organisations, including the OECD, E.ON UK plc and the European Capital Markets Institute. His interdisciplinary policy-focused research spans both finance and innovation research. His current research interests include; financial regulation, financial innovation, the impact of technology on financial markets, carbon and commodity markets, and energy finance.