### Narrowing the "expectations deficit"

The evolving EU-Japan security cooperation (2020-2022)

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## "Expectations deficit" in EU-Japan relations

 "Capability-Expectations Gap (CEG) = high expectations + low capabilities (Hill, 1993)

 Reversed CEG: "Expectations deficit" = low expectations + high capabilities (Tsuruoka, 2008)

Also in EU-ASEAN states relations (Wong, 2012)

• Especially in the domain of (hard) security

### Indifferent security relationship

- "Reluctant partners" (Nuttall, 1996)
- "The problem (in EU-Japan relations) is that there is no problem" (EPC 2004)
- "Civilian Power" and "Ordinary Power" identities (Bacon & Nakamura, 2018)
- "A friend of a friend" (Kirchner & Dorussen, 2021)

Table. Sources of the Expectations Deficit in EU-Japan Relations

		ORIGINS		
		Japan	Europe / the EU	
OBJECT OF LOW EXPECTATIONS	Europe as a whole  Focus on the US and Asia (Japan's indifference to Europe)		Europe's indifference (and even arrogance) to Japan / Different values and principles?	
	The EU as an international actor	Lack of understanding on EU policy-making / Preference for bilateral relations with major EU countries	EU's failure in its common foreign and security policy / Complexities of EU policy- making / EU's lack of competences / Different perceptions or interests?	

Tsuruoka, M. (2008) 'Expectation Deficit' in EU-Japan Relations: Why the Relationship Cannot Flourish. *Current Politics and Economics of Asia*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 107–26.

### Divergent threat perception and security interests

 Japan is much more focused on China as a threat, whereas the EU focuses on Russia

 Reliance on the US as a primary security provider (NATO, Japan-US alliance)

 Different concerns: immigration, terrorism, organized crime for the EU; maritime security, DPRK's nuclear/missile threats for Japan

# EU-Japan pre-2020 security relations




Figure 1.1 Intervening variables between levels of threat perception and levels of cooperation.

XUECHEN CHEN AND XINCHUCHU GAO

21

TABLE 2. KEY INSTRUMENTS OF EU-ASIA SECURITY COOPERATION (BILATERAL)

		Agreement/ Action Plan	Hard Security	Soft Security
ateral	China	EU-China 2020 strategic agenda for cooperation (2013)     The Joint Declaration on Non-proliferation and Arms Control     EU-China Partnership on Climate Change (2005)     EU-China Roadmap on energy cooperation (2016)	EU-China informal security dialogue attended by high-level military and government officials, academics and security experts (2018)     EU-China dialogue on Defence and Security (2014)	EU-China Summit (since 1998)  EU-China High-level Strategic Dialogue (since 2010)  EU-China Connectivity Plat form (since 2015)  EU-China Cyber Taskforce (2012)  EU-China Water Policy Dialogue (part of which is related to soft security issues such as food and energy security; since 2019)  EU-China Disaster Risk Management Project (2012-2017)  EU-led joint antipiracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden (Operation Atalanta), with Chin being an active contributor
	Japan	Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation (2001)     EU-Japan Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in criminal matters (2009)     EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (2018)     EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity (2019)	<ul> <li>Regular dialogues on defence and security policy between the EU and Japan</li> <li>High-level military figures' visits be- tween the EU and Japan</li> <li>Defence technologi- cal and industrial cooperation agree- ments between EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden) and Japan</li> </ul>	EU-Japan Summit (since 1984)  EU-Japan Strategic Dialogu on East Asia's Security Environment (since 2005)  EU-Japan Strategic Dialogu on Central Asia's Security Environment (since 2006)  EU-Japan High Level Group (since 2010)  EU-Japan Cyber Dialogue (since 2014)  EU-Japan expert meeting on humanitarian assistance and emergency relief (since 2016)  EU-Japan counter-piracy cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden

Chen, X., & Gao, X. (2020). Bridging the Capability–Expectations Gap? An Analysis of the New Dynamics in the EU's Security Strategy Towards Asia1. *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies*, 18(3), 9-36.

# Low convergence of threat perception and insufficient security cooperation between the EU and Japan

Threat perception increased; but policy diverged, cooperation insufficient




Fig. 3 EU–Japan security relations: threat perception, policy convergence and cooperation. Source: Kirchner and Dorussen 2019, p. 209.

Kirchner, E.J., Dorussen, H. "New horizons in EU–Japan security cooperation". *Asia Europe Journal* **19**, 27–41 (2021).

Lack of convergence in threat perception and policy response in a particular security sector as the major constraint on collaboration

1990-2017, the scope of EU-Japan security cooperation lags behind

EU-Japan SPA provides a platform to extend security cooperation?

Will the Indo-Pacific strategy(ies) change anything (especially in "military security" and "regional security")?

### Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision

- Proposed by ex-PM Abe Shinzo (2016)
- Challenges of the rise of China
- "Proactive contribution to peace"
- Japan's strategic vision as a "normal" security actor
- Maritime security, connectivity, quality infrastructure, etc.

### **Achieving the FOIP vision**



Source: "Free and Open Indo-Pacific": Japan Ministry of Defense's Approach

### Efforts and cooperation on FOIP in other countries and regions

In collaboration with FOIP related activities of partners, Japan promotes the vision of FOIP by evoking a sense of ownership based on each vision, with a shared belief in the shared values and principles such as the rule of law.

### Europe

#### UK

- Shared a view to strengthen cooperation on (i) maritime security, (ii) quality infrastructure, and (iii) cyber security including 5G (Summit Meeting in January 2019)
- Announced further engagement in the Indo-Pacific in the UK's "Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy" (March 2021)

#### France

- "France's Indo-Pacific Strategy" (July 2021)
- Shared a view to continue cooperation on maritime security, climate change, the environment and biodiversity, and quality infrastructure, to reinforce cooperation between defense force and to cooperate with ASEAN (Summit Meeting in July 2021)

#### Germany

- Confirmed cooperation toward achievement of FOIP (Summit Meeting in February 2019)
- "Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific" (September 2020)

#### Netherlands

"Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia" (November 2020)

### ΕU

- "Connecting Europe & Asia: The EU Strategy" (September 2018)
- Signed a document entitled <u>"The Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between Japan and the European Union"</u> (September 2019)
- Foreign Minister MOTEGI attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council and explained the vision of FOIP (January 2021)
- "Council conclusions on an EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" (April 2021)
- "A Globally Connected Europe", EU's geostrategic and global approach to connectivity (July 2021)
- "Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" (September 2021)

#### V4

 Shared the view to promote cooperation toward FOIP ("V4 plus Japan" Foreign Ministers' Meeting in May 2021

#### Japan-Australia-India-U.S.

- The four Ministers concurred on <u>further developing practical cooperation in various areas</u> such as quality infrastructure, maritime security, counter-terrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, education and human resource development, in order <u>to promote FOIP</u>. (The Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting in October 2020)
- The four leaders concurred to develop cooperation in the areas of vaccine, critical
  and emerging technologies, climate change, infrastructure, space, and cyber security.
  They also concurred to hold the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. summit every year, and to
  continue broadening coordination and building up concrete cooperation with a range
  of partners, for the realization of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." (Japan-AustraliaIndia-U.S. Leaders' Video Conference in March 2021, Japan-Australia-India-U.S.
  Summit Meeting in September 2021)

#### ASEAN / Mekong countries

- Adopted "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" (AOIP) (June 2019)
- The Leaders of the Mekong countries <u>noted with appreciation on Japan's vision to promote a FOIP</u> to contribute to the peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world. (Joint Statement of the Mekong-Japan Summit in November 2020)
- Adopted "Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN
   Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" (November 2020). It was confirmed that the AOIP and
   Japan's FOIP share fundamental principles and to strengthen ASEAN-Japan Strategic
   Partnership through enhanced practical cooperation and synergy in the four areas as
   outlined in the AOIP, namely, maritime cooperation, connectivity, SDGs, and economic
   and other possible areas of cooperation.

#### India

- "Act East" policy (Prime Minister Modi's speech in June 2018)
- Published <u>"India-Japan</u> <u>Development Cooperation in the</u> <u>Indo-Pacific"</u> (Summit Meeting in October 2018)
- Announced <u>"Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative"</u> (November 2019)

#### Africa

- AU Leaders take good note of the initiative of a free and open Indo-Pacific (TICAD7 Yokohama Declaration 2019, adopted in August 2019)
- Cooperation under the vision of FOIP has been affirmed with six countries. (Foreign Minister Motegi's visits to Africa, December 2020 and January 2021)

#### Australia

- The leaders affirmed that the two countries share a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and shared the view on working together for regional stability and prosperity (Summit Meeting in November 2018)
- "An open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific" (Prime Minister Morison's foreign policy speech in June 2019). Promote "Pacific Stepup" in the Pacific Island region.
- The leaders confirmed that Japan and Australia, as "Special Strategic Partners" which share the basic values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and strategic interests, will together work toward realizing a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". (Summit Meeting in November 2020)

#### Canada

- Further strengthen the strategic partnership under the vision of FOIP (Summit Meeting in August 2019)
- Published "Shared Japan-Canada Priorities
   Contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (Foreign Ministers' Meeting in May 2021)

#### US

- Announced concrete cooperation to maintain and reinforce FOIP (Summit Meeting in September 2018, visit of Vice President Pence to Japan in November 2018, Summit Meeting in May 2019)
- Shared the view with the Biden administration to work together for the realization of FOIP (QUAD Leaders' Summit meeting in September 2021)

### **Pacific Island Countries**

 PIF Leaders welcomed Japan's contribution through "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" (PALM 9 in July 2021)

#### NZ

- Materialize the partnership in achieving FOIP in coordination with New Zealand's "Pacific Reset" policy on the Pacific (Summit Meeting in September 2019)
- Reaffirm strengthening of cooperation particularly in the areas of (i) Oceans, (ii) Climate Change, and (iii) Connectivity (Joint Declaration between Foreign Ministers in October 2019)

### Indo-Pacific: A new focal point of EU-Japan cooperation?

• The growing importance of India and the need to balance relations with China; the Indo-Pacific arena offers the perfect showcase for what the EU and Japan can do best together.

(Gilson, Julie. EU–Japan Relations and the Crisis of Multilateralism. Routledge, 2019, p. 235)

• Japan and Europe share fundamental values such as democracy and can expect continued substantial cooperation as strategic partners...The Japanese government needs to continue pursuing active diplomacy to further heighten the interest of European countries, the EU and NATO in the Indo-Pacific, and deepen their engagement.

(JIIA, Strategic Annual Report, 2021)

# Why Japan could be the key to the EU's Indo-Pacific ambitions







What's Next for EU-Japan Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?

### Research Design

### Research question

Has the longstanding "expectations deficit" in EU-Japan relations undergone any transformations in the recent three years?

### Data collection

- (1) Traditional media: News items from *Yomiuri Shimbun*, *Asashi Shimbun*, *Nikkei* (March-June, 2020 & 2021) (n=2,043); texts of news items containing the co-occurrence of keywords "EU" (欧州連合) and "Indo-Pacific" (インド太平洋) in the three newspapers in 2020-2022 (n=378)
- (2) Social media: Twitter account "Mission of Japan to the EU" (March-June, 2020 & 2021) (n=177)
- (3) Elite interviews: Transcripts of interviews with 20 relevant Japanese elites (journalists, officials or diplomats, scholars, etc.) (n=20)
- Methodology: Mixed methods
- (1) Quantitative—Content analysis, Text analysis (Semantic network analysis)
- (2) Qualitative—Discourse analysis (Critical Discourse Analysis approach, CDA), Semi-structured interview

### Data collection: EU and Indo-Pacific




Figure 1 No. of news items with EU-related keywords in three Japanese newspapers (March-June, 2020 and 2021)





Figure 2 No. of news items mentioning both "EU" and "Indo-Pacific" in three Japanese newspapers (2020-2022)

# High salience and positive evaluation of the EU in the context of "Indo-Pacific"






Figure 5 Centrality of the EU in the context of "Indo-Pacific" in three Japanese newspapers

Figure 6 Evaluation of the EU in the context of "Indo-Pacific" in three Japanese newspapers

# Much more active online PR campaigns from Japan to the EU

**No. of post:**  $2020 (9) \rightarrow 2021 (168, EU$ -related only) **The new ambassador** (since October 2020): MASAKI Yasushi (official account 19.6% retweeted)





Today Ambassador Masaki @Europarl\_EN #AFET/D-JP.
"Our • Shared conviction that sustainable growth is only possible by developing transparent, open, inclusive and sustainable connectivity, and within a rule-based order..."

See the summary here: eu.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr\_en/11\_000...

Wasushi MASAKI.Amb. of Japan to EU. 駐EU大使 正木 靖 @y... · Apr 13 I appreciated the many important points raised which will contribute to the development of Japan's strategy to work with the EU + other like-minded partners, incl. on #Connectivity, #IndoPacific & the multilateral rules-based order. @Europarl\_EN #AFET/D-JP

### Connectivity for Resilience (1)

### Japan and the EU are natural partners. Why?

- Shared strategy
- Achievements and Trust
- · A head start for tangible results
- Forging inclusive partnerships



The Europa Connectivity
Forum

12:32 AM · Apr 14, 2021 · Twitter Web App

# Hashtags

 "#IndoPacific" (33) and "#FOIP" (18) mentioned in 42.5% of the tagged tweets



Figure 7 A word cloud of hashtags from the "Mission of Japan to the EU"'s tweets during March-June 2021










Figure 8 Tweets about EU-Japan security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region from the Twitter of "Mission of Japan to the EU"

### Expected strategy: Indo-Pacific

Augusto Santos Silva (Portuguese FM): "The EU and Japan have a very close position (regarding security strategy in the Indo-Pacific region)".

(*Nikkei*, May 27, 2021)

Minister Motegi welcomed the Council conclusions on the "EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" as EU's strong will for its engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. High Representative Borrell expressed his gratitude for Minister Motegi's explanation of the vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" at the EU Foreign Affairs Council in January, and stated that it contributed to the formulation of the "EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific".

### (Japan-EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting, May 4, 2021)

DM Kishi also emphasized the importance of Japan and EU nations' confronting them together, that are sharing common values, and making our cooperation for maintaining and enhancing the vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" irreversible.

#### (Kishi Nobuo, the first Japanese defense minister to speak at the European Parliament, June 17, 2021)

The EU is strengthening its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

(*Yomiuri*, April 21, 2021)

Today the COVID-19 pandemic, the growing impacts of climate change and new security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and worldwide make our cooperation more necessary than ever.

(EU-Japan Summit 2021 Joint Statement, May 27, 2021)



サントスシルバ外相は「EU と日本の立場は非常に近い」 とした (ブリュッセル)



#### ●EUのインド太平洋戦略の大枠の 主なポイント

- ▶インド太平洋地域での政治、通商での立場を強化
- ▶高速・大容量通信規格「5G」整備やデータ保護
- ▶中国との投資協定、オーストラリア、インドネ
- ▶価値観を共有する国々と、各分野での対話・連携





6月17日17時から、#岸防衛大臣 は日本の防衛大臣とし て初めて、欧州議会「安全保障・防衛小委員会」の公 開セッションに出席しました。

[Kishi Defense Minister's Movement: Attendance of Kishi Defense Minister to the European Parliament

Japanese Defense Minister to attend a public session of the European Parliament's Security and Defense Subcommittee




6:43 PM - Jun 17, 2021 - Twitter for iPad

### High-frequency words

- **Method:** Text analysis
- Samples: texts of news items in the three media's news items comprising the keywords "EU" (欧州連合) and "Indo-Pacific" (インド太平洋) in Japanese from 2020 to 2022
- Units of the corpus: 7,080 paragraphs (consisting of 17,236 sentences)
- Morphological parser: ChaSen
- **Software:** KH Coder

Nouns		Adjectives/Adv	verbs	Verbs		Places/Organizatio	ns
協力cooperation	156	自由free	74	示すshow	78	E U EU	588
関係relationship	151	重要important	60	開くopen	70	中国China	379
強化enhancement	126	安定stable	47	強めるstrengthen	63	インド太平洋Indo-Pacific	372
安全保障security	123	初めてfirst-ever	34	向ける turn towards	50	日本Japan	262
連携alignment	102	強いstrong	29	巡る concerning	42	欧州Europe	192
関与engagement	82	平和peaceful	24	深めるdeepen	41	米国US	181
会談talk	80	必要necessary	23	述べるstate	29	英国UK	117
協定agreement	60	可能possible	21	進めるpromote	29	台湾Taiwan	105
発表announcement	57	大きいlarge	21	打ち出すlaunch	25	フランスFrance	102
貿易trade	54	新たnew	19	行うconduct	24	ドイツGermany	82
加盟accession	51	主要major	17	基づくbased on	23	インドIndia	60
防衛defence	51	安全safe	14	受けるreceive	23	ロシアRussia	55
会議meeting	50	多様diverse	14	続けるcontinue	22	アジアAsia	48
共同joint	49	独自unique	14	求めるpursue	19	ウクライナUkraine	39
協議discussion	49	緊密close	13	位置づけるposition	18	オーストラリアAustralia	37
派遣deployment	49	近いnearly	11	持つhave	18	南シナ海 South China Sea	30
合意agreement	45	幅広いwide	10	目指すaim	18	A S E A N ASEAN	29
投資investment	45	明らかevident	9	語るspeak	16	東欧Eastern Europe	23
重視emphasis	41	明確clear	9	加えるadd	15	香港Hong Kong	16
確認confirmation	40	厳しいsevere	8	高めるenhance	14	G 7 <b>G</b> 7	16



### **Word Clusters**

- Cluster 07: Indo-Pacific (インド太平洋)- EU (EU/欧州連合)-China (中国)-Japan (日本)-Taiwan (台湾)-security (安全保障)-enhancement(強化/強める)-cooperation(協力)-alignment(連携)-engagement(関与)-maritime (海洋)-security (安全保障)-defence(防衛)
- Cluster 03: defence (防衛) -dispatch (派遣)-aircraft carrier (空母)-warship (軍艦)-joint (共同)-training (訓練)-stopping at a port (寄港)-Germany (ドイツ)-France (フランス)
- Cluster 06: democracy (民主主義)-values (価値)-stable (安定)-peaceful (平和)-human rights (人権)-shared (共有)-based (基づく)-international (国際)-order (秩序)
- Other actors: UK (英国), ASEAN (ASEAN/東南アジア 諸国連合), Quad (日米, 豪, インド)

- Shared values and common strategic goals
- Security-oriented agenda-setting
- Positive evaluations, high expectations of cooperation

### The EU's expectations of Japan

No.	Contributor(s)	Newspaper	Headline	Date
1	Patricia Flor,	Nikkei	EU-Japan partnership has a	2021.2.15
	(Ambassador, Head	(Nikkei Asian	bright future	
	of the Delegation of	Review)		
	the EU to Japan)			
2	Patricia Flor, and	Asahi	POINT OF VIEW/ For a	2022.2.22
	Philippe Setton,	Shimbun	strengthened partnership	
	(Ambassador of	(Asahi	between the European Union	
	France to Japan)	Shimbun Asia	and Japan in the Indo-Pacific	
		& Japan		
		Watch/AJW)		
3	Ursula von der Leyen	Yomiuri	EU to "expand cooperation"	2022.5.13
	(President of the	Shimbun (The	with Japan	
	European	Japan News)		
	Commission)			
4	Richard Tibbels	Yomiuri	EU Special Envoy:	2022.12.15
	(Special Envoy for	Shimbun	Expecting Japan as G7	
	the Indo-Pacific at the		Presidency'	
	EEAS)		「G7議長国 日本に期	
			待」 E U 特使	

The Asahi Shimbun > Opinion > Views > article

Agreements form solid basis for joint action in post-pandemic world





Palestinian medics unpack Moderna's COVID-19 vaccines on Feb. 3: EU and Japan can cooperate in COVAX facility a

From Patricia Flor, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to

### 日本經濟新聞

トップ 速報 オピニオン 経済 政治 ビジネス 金融 マーケット マネーのまなび テック 国際

### インド太平洋地域の平和安定「共通の利益」駐日EU大使

ヨーロッパ +フォローする 2021年2月15日 19:30

@ 保存





パトリシア・フロア駐日EU大使

#### POINT OF VIEW/ For a strengthened partnership between the European Union and Japan in the Indo-Pacific

PATRICIA FLOR and PHILIPPE SETTON/ special to The Asahi Shimbun

インド太平洋戦略「EUと日本、協力強化を」 きょう閣僚フォーラム、駐日仏・EU大使が寄稿

February 22, 2022 at 13:00 JST



Patricia Flor, Ambassador of the European Union to Japan, left, and Philippe Setton, Ambassador of France to Japan (Provided by the EU Delegation to Japan and the French Embassy in Tokyo)

ンド太平洋戦略「EUと日本、協力強化を」

#### Von der Leyen: Ukraine crisis shows Japan, EU can rely on each other



©European Union 2020 European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen

🏂 By Tomoko Hatakeyama / Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent

15:41 JST, May 12, 2022

### EU、日本と対露連携強化



14日、東京都内で取材に応じるティベルス・EUインド太 平洋特使=松久高広撮影

### "Japan is our closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region"

### Joint Statement EU-Japan Summit 2022

(the 28th EU-Japan summit in Tokyo, Japan)

1. We, the leaders of the European Union (EU) and Japan, reaffirm our close and comprehensive partnership based upon the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and Strategic Partnership Agreement, grounded in common interests and the shared values of freedom, respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, open, free and fair trade, effective multilateralism and the rules-based international order.

• • •

4. ... We will enhance cooperation for a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive and based on the rule of law and democratic values, as well as unconstrained by coercion, based upon our respective, complementary strategies for the Indo-Pacific region.

**Source:** European Council, EEAS

### EU-Japan summit, 12 May 2022

### Main results

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, representing the EU, met Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the 28th EU-Japan summit in Tokyo, Japan.

The leaders of the EU and Japan reaffirmed their **close and comprehensive partnership**.

The EU and Japan have a deep and dynamic relationship.

Japan is our closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region

Russia's war against Ukraine has shown that deeper

cooperation is not a luxury, it's a vital necessity.

Charles Michel, President of the European Council



Press statement by Charles Michel, President of the European Council, following the 28th EU-Japan summit

### Elite interviews

How would you define the current relationship between your country and the European Union?

The only options in play are 'friend' or 'partner'. None of the others make sense for EU-Japan relations.

The phrase 'likeminded partner' is often used in official documents.



パートナー。同盟国。友人。

Partners. Allies. Friends.


@kishida230

#EUJapanSummit

翻译推文



11:00 · 2022/5/12 · Twitter for iPhone




11. In September 2021 the EU launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important do you think this is for your country? Why?

The Indo-Pacific Strategy is very important for Japan.

Priorities within this strategy are connectivity, digital issues and supply chains.


People were less inclined to mention hard or soft security in this context, which suggests perhaps that security issues are not seen as central to the IPS itself.





22. On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate the importance of the EU to your country <u>currently</u>?

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{Mean} & = 4.05 \\ \text{Median} & = 4 \\ \text{Mode} & = 4 \end{array}$ 




22. On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate the importance of the EU to your country <u>currently</u>?

What about the US, China and Russia?

US = 5.0China = 4.7EU = 4.0Russia = 3.7

### Relative importance of countries



### EU's expected role from the Japanese perspective

### 2020

### 1. Coordinated leadership in the COVID-19 crisis

- EU should be a command tower. 司令塔になるべき欧州連合(EU) Asahi\_2020\_53
- EU should play a coordinating role. E U が調整役を担うべきである。Yomiuri\_2020\_47

### 2. Like-minded partner and pillars of liberal order

- Europe is Japan's partner with shared values such as free trade and democracy. 日本にとって欧州は自由貿易や民主主義などの価値観を共有するパートナー Nikkei\_2020\_5
- EU is a powerful promoter of multilateralism. E U は多国間主義の強力な推進者 Asahi\_2020\_72
- "Japan and the EU need to lead the world" 「日本とEUが世界をリードする必要がある」 Yomiuri 2020 153

### 2021

1. A geopolitical player in the Indo-Pacific region, a strategic partner with shared values, a security partner with Japan to tackle the challenge of "China Threat"

(The EU) wants to increase its presence as a security player in the Indo-Pacific region

EUもインド太平洋で「安全保障の担い手としての存在感を高めたい」(*Asahi*, 2021-5-58)

2. A supplier of COVID-19 vaccines to Japan

Kono Taro (former Japanese FM): If (vaccine) exports stop, it will affect Japan-EU relations

「輸出が止まれば日EU関係に影響する」 (Yomiuri, 2021-5-25)

3. A normative power and rule maker: climate change, AI regulations, etc.

Go beyond the Paris Agreement, which is a voluntary effort. The EU must act as a rule maker

EUはルールメーカーとして動かねばならない (Asashi, 2021-4-4)

## Consensus between the EU and Japan

- Interdependence: The security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific is indivisible
- Mutual perception: Like-minded partners, friends, and allies
- Threat perception: Both China and Russia are existential threats to the EU and Japan, they are revisionist states who aim to change the status quo (liberal international order) by force and coercion; rapprochement with the US after Trump
- Convergence: Shared values, identities, and strategic visions—policy coordination and cooperation—"Indo-Pacific" strategies
- Expectations: Deeper and wider security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region (maritime security, cybersecurity, economic security, etc.)

### EU-Japan relations in the future

- From "expectations deficit" to "capability-expectations gap" (CEG)?
- A natural result (EPA, SPA, 2018), accelerated by "black swan" events (Brexit, Trump, COVID-19, Russia-Ukraine War, etc.)
- Focusing on capacity-building, seeking a equilibrium between expectations and capabilities
- "Indo-Pacific" will be a crucial venue of bilateral security cooperation

## Areas to strengthen

Interviewees were also asked in which policy areas they thought that Japan and the EU should strengthen their cooperation. Respondents were asked to identify three policy areas, and came up with following answers, ranked in terms of frequency:

- Digital (9)
- Trade (8)
- China (8)
- Russia / Ukraine (8)
- Maritime Security (6)
- Environmental issues (6)
- Academic cooperation (4)
- Indo-Pacific Strategy, Connectivity, economic security, supply chains (2 apiece)
- HADR, strategic dialogue, critical infrastructure (3 apiece)

Although digital and trade were the policy areas most frequently identified, another valid way to aggregate the data is to note that 25 of 60 answers identified the need to intensify security cooperation. Answers referred to the 'threat' of China and North Korea, and to the Ukraine, and to a recognition that maritime security should be given greater priority. There were also references to strategic dialogue and to HADR.

## Overall findings 1

To summarize the eight sets of findings analysed in this section:

- 1. There was very high coverage of the EU in the Japanese print media compared to the other three countries being researched.
- 2. More than one half of news items featured the EU as a major or secondary actor.
- 3. Although there were comparatively fewer news items on the bilateral relationship in isolation, the increased significance of the EU-Japan relationship is seen more in the context of new security developments within the region as a whole.
- 4. There were a substantial number of news items connecting the EU to the Indo-Pacific, and the EU enjoyed similar levels of centrality in these items as it did in the general news items on the EU.
- 5. An important point to emphasize is that the evaluation of the EU in news items connecting it to the Indo-Pacific is very significantly more positive than the overall evaluation for general news items on the EU.

# Overall findings 2

- 6. Frequency and co-occurrence analysis shows that the geopolitical concept of the Indo-Pacific provides a valuable opportunity for the two parties to deepen their security cooperation.
- 7. The Japanese media frame the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy as a means to counter the 'China threat', rather than valuing the relationship as having intrinsic value in its own right.
- 8. There are significant co-occurrence clusters linking the concept of the Indo-Pacific to opportunities for enhanced security cooperation, identifying the significance of maritime security cooperation, and the significance of normative like-mindedness.
- 9. The Twitter / X account of the Mission of Japan to the EU makes a concerted attempt to communicate and re-enforce these themes.
- 10. These themes are mirrored back in the newspaper interviews given by senior EU figures in the Japanese print media.
- 11. Finally, these themes also recur persistently in the opinions of elite Japanese security influencers: the EU-Japan relationship is growing in significance, and is a partnership of like-minded states. The EU's new Indo-Pacific Strategy is seen as very important, and should provide the catalyst for greater cooperation across a range of hard security issues.

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THE END

Thank You!